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Empirismo modal y leyes físicas

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  • Otávio Bueno,
  • Cristián Soto
Otávio Bueno
University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, United States / Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan.
Cristián Soto
Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile / London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1219

Publicado 2026-01-05

Palabras clave

  • Modalidad,
  • Leyes,
  • Empirismo,
  • Posibilidad,
  • Necesidad
  • Modality,
  • Laws,
  • Empiricism,
  • Possibility,
  • Necessity
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Desde una perspectiva empirista, sostenemos que la modalidad física da cuenta de mejor manera del estatus modal de las leyes (entendidas en términos empiristas, como regularidades empíricas adecuadas). La modalidad nómica no tiene que ser construida en términos de propiedades modales metafísicas. En cambio, argumentaremos que vivimos en un mundo pleno de posibilidades y necesidades físicas que son investigadas por procesos tales como acumulación de evidencia, refinamiento de prácticas inferenciales y procesos de construcción de teorías y modelos. El empirismo puede, sin problemas, tomar distancia de las teorías humeanas de modalidad nómica, defendiendo que las leyes no se restringen a ofrecer resúmenes de fenómenos actuales, sino que nos informan acerca de rangos de posibilidades y necesidades físicas en sus dominios. Nada de esto requiere que introduzcamos un fundamento metafísico para la modalidad nómica.

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