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Entre sustancias y procesos: Superando las divisiones metafísicas en torno a la fundamentalidad, la persistencia y la individuación

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  • Benazir Flores Valdivia,
  • Laura Nuño de la Rosa,
  • Vanesa Triviño Alonso
Benazir Flores Valdivia
Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain.
Laura Nuño de la Rosa
Institute of Philosophy, Spanish National Research Council, Spain.
Vanesa Triviño Alonso
Department of Education, Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1234

Publicado 2026-04-07

Palabras clave

  • Metafísica procesualista,
  • Metafísica sustancialista,
  • Fundamentalidad,
  • Persistencia,
  • Individuación
  • Process Metaphysics,
  • Substance Metaphysics,
  • Fundamentality,
  • Persistence,
  • Individuation
  • metafísica de processos,
  • metafísica de substâncias,
  • fundamentalidade,
  • persistência,
  • individualidade
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Desde principios del siglo XXI, los enfoques procesualistas han ganado protagonismo en la metafísica analítica y la filosofía de la ciencia, lo que ha provocado diversas respuestas por parte de los defensores del sustancialismo. Sin embargo, la polarización del debate entre la metafísica procesualista y la metafísica sustancialista a menudo ha llevado a simplificaciones que oscurecen el potencial para un diálogo constructivo. Este artículo sostiene que estos marcos filosóficos no deben tratarse como sistemas monolíticos, sino analizarse a través del prisma de problemas metafísicos concretos como son la fundamentalidad, la persistencia y la individuación. Centrándonos en la metafísica procesualista, examinamos cómo diferentes interpretaciones dentro de ambas tradiciones conceptualizan estos problemas. Nuestro análisis revela tanto áreas de compatibilidad como de divergencia, sugiriendo que la división entre procesualismo y sustancialismo es más matizada de lo que comúnmente se supone. Concluimos abogando por un enfoque metafísico más flexible que permita la integración de criterios de ambos marcos.

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