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Especismo: Un enfoque epistémico

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  • Pablo Magaña
Pablo Magaña
Departamento de Filosofía, Trinity College Dublin, Dublín, Irlanda.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1261

Publicado 2025-09-25

Palabras clave

  • Especismo,
  • Animales,
  • Ética animal,
  • Justificación epistémica,
  • Sesgos
  • Speciesism,
  • Animals,
  • Animal Ethics,
  • Epistemic Justification,
  • Bias
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

¿Está justificado otorgar un trato favorable a un individuo, humano o no humano, en virtud de la especie a la que pertenece? Durante décadas, los filósofos han discutido acerca de la justificación moral del especismo. Este debate, no obstante, corre el riesgo de enquistarse en un choque de intuiciones últimas de difícil solución, lo que ha llevado a varios autores a desarrollar recientemente un enfoque epistémico del especismo, que examina no la corrección moral, sino la fiabilidad epistémica de los juicios especistas. Es decir, si estos juicios se producen en condiciones (o como resultado de mecanismos) epistémicamente favorables. En este artículo, persigo tres objetivos. En primer lugar, sondear y articular de un modo coherente un giro epistémico en la literatura que, hasta el momento, no ha sido teorizado como tal. En segundo lugar, explicitar las razones por las que es deseable adoptar un enfoque epistémico que suplemente el enfoque moral clásico. Y, en tercer lugar, analizar críticamente tres contribuciones recientes, sugiriendo caminos por los que el enfoque epistémico podría transitar en el futuro —caminos por el momento desatendidos—.

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