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Una lectura representacional de los pilares de la vision estadistica: hacia un análisis perspectivista en biología poblacional

Cristián Novelli
Subunidad de Lógica y Metodología, Unidad Académica Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay.
Tiago Rama
Subunidad de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia, Unidad Académica Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay.

Publicado 2026-06-24

Palabras clave

  • Representación científica,
  • Perspectivismo científico,
  • Visión estadística,
  • Modelos matemáticos,
  • Selección natural,
  • Biología poblacional
  • ...Más
    Menos
  • Scientific Representation,
  • Scientific Perspectivism,
  • Statisticalism,
  • Mathematical Models,
  • Natural Selection,
  • Population Biology
  • ...Más
    Menos

Resumen

Dentro del ámbito de la teoría evolutiva, las posturas causalista y estadística postulan diferentes formas de entender los conceptos y parámetros que los modelos poblacionales de la Síntesis Moderna involucran. En especial, la discusión se centra en gran parte sobre si la selección natural y la deriva deben entenderse como procesos causales o como parámetros estadísticos de los modelos. Este trabajo propone una lectura representacional de los compromisos centrales establecidos por una de estas posturas: los cuatro “pilares” de la visión estadística (Walsh et al., 2017). Para esto se realiza un análisis de los mismos a partir de las herramientas conceptuales del acercamiento de Van Fraassen (2008) en cuanto a la representación científica, entendiendo los pilares de la visión estadística como consecuencias del carácter representacional de los modelos poblacionales. A la hora de establecer cada uno de los pilares, enfatizamos la relevancia puesta en el uso de los modelos para ciertos objetivos científicos, así como en las características perspectivistas de los modelos poblacionales. Esto nos permite contrarrestar ciertas críticas e interpretaciones que la visión estadística ha recibido; en particular, argumentamos que es incorrecto asumir que la visión estadística establece que la genética poblacional sea “simplemente” matemática.

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