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Trayectorias y desafíos en el Modelo de la Esquizofrenia como Trastorno de la Ipseidad

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  • Pablo Lopez-Silva,
  • Pablo Álvarez-Fernández
Pablo Lopez-Silva
Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.
Pablo Álvarez-Fernández
Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1283

Publicado 2026-06-09

Palabras clave

  • Esquizofrenia,
  • Ipseidad,
  • Psicopatología,
  • Fenomenología,
  • Psiquiatría
  • Schizophrenia,
  • Ipseity,
  • Psychopathology,
  • Phenomenology,
  • Psychiatry
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

El Modelo de la Esquizofrenia como Trastorno de la Ipseidad (IDM) caracteriza los síntomas de la condición como alteraciones radicales en la estructura subjetiva de la conciencia. Recientes críticas provenientes desde la filosofía de la mente y la tradición fenomenológica han motivado la formulación de una versión revisada del modelo (IDMr). Sin embargo, no todos los defensores del IDM comparten esta estrategia y algunos se preguntan incluso si realmente existe continuidad entre los dos modelos. Este artículo analiza los alcances y limitaciones del tránsito del IDM al IDMr. Luego de clarificar las principales ideas del IDM con un énfasis especial en la manera en que conceptualiza las nociones de sí-mismo (self) e ipseidad en su caracterización de la esquizofrenia, el artículo explora las críticas más relevantes al modelo original y evalúa las respuestas de sus defensores. Luego, se examina la versión revisada del modelo, evaluando los avances que representa, los problemas que deja abiertos y el grado de continuidad que mantiene con respecto a su formulación original.

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