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Teleosemántica y comunicación animal

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  • Esteban Withrington
Esteban Withrington
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad de México, México.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1318

Publicado 2026-07-23

Palabras clave

  • Señales animales,
  • Etología,
  • Referencia funcional,
  • Representación errónea
  • Animals Signals,
  • Ethology,
  • Functional Reference,
  • Misrepresentation
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Este artículo propone una explicación teleosemántica híbrida del significado en la comunicación entre animales (no humanos). Distingo dos familias de casos: señales sobre acontecimientos externos al emisor y señales sobre la identidad o la condición actual del emisor. Según el enfoque teleosemántico más influyente sobre la comunicación animal, tales señales representan las condiciones del mundo requeridas para que la conducta del receptor guiada por la señal resulte beneficiosa. Sostengo que, considerado por sí solo, este enfoque basado en el beneficio conduce a atribuciones de contenido poco plausibles, que se apartan tanto de la práctica etológica como de aquello que la propuesta se presenta como capaz de ofrecer en casos de comunicación animal. Para abordar este problema, recurro a un marco teleosemántico que desarrollé previamente para representaciones perceptivas simples, el cual aquí extiendo al caso de las señales animales. En particular, complemento el enfoque basado en el beneficio con una condición de producción de la señal que restringe el contenido a aquello que causalmente provoca la emisión de la señal por parte del emisor. El híbrido resultante asigna contenidos plausibles tanto para señales sobre acontecimientos del mundo externo como para señales sobre la identidad o la condición actual del emisor.

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