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¿Tienen los bebés la capacidad de leer mentes?

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  • Anyerson Stiths Gómez Tabares
Anyerson Stiths Gómez Tabares
Universidad Católica Luis Amigó, Medellín, Colombia.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1342

Publicado 2026-10-16

Palabras clave

  • Ciencia Cognitiva,
  • Teoría de la Mente,
  • Niñez,
  • Creencias,
  • Cognición social,
  • Procesos Mentales,
  • Conducta Social (DeCS/MeSH)
    • ...Más
    Menos
  • Cognitive Science,
  • Theory of Mind,
  • Childhood,
  • Beliefs,
  • Social Cognition,
  • Mental Processes,
  • Social Behavior (DeCS/MeSH)
    • ...Más
    Menos

Cómo citar

Gómez Tabares, A. S. (2026). ¿Tienen los bebés la capacidad de leer mentes?. Análisis Filosófico. https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1342
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

La lectura de mentes es la capacidad de atribuir y responder a los estados mentales de los demás. Tradicionalmente, se ha considerado que la lectura de mentes requiere de la posesión de conceptos mentales y emerge en niños de cuatro años. Sin embargo, los estudios recientes han mostrado que los bebés tienen una comprensión implícita de los estados mentales, lo que sugiere que esta capacidad surge tempranamente en el neurodesarrollo. Los hallazgos y la interpretación de la lectura de mentes en bebés han sido cuestionados. En este artículo se debate si la lectura de mentes implícita es realmente lectura de mentes, o si refleja procesos de submentalización. Para ello, se analiza el carácter conceptual de la controversia entre las explicaciones mentalistas y submentalistas, y se destaca la dificultad de encontrar una solución empírica. También se discuten los supuestos de la teoría de lectura de mentes como posesión de conceptos y se analizan los argumentos centrales de las teorías submentalistas y mentalistas. Se presentan argumentos en contra de la tesis de que la lectura de mentes implícita involucra la representación de conceptos mentales. Se propone que los bebés tienen una capacidad preconceptual que se enriquece con los procesos de intencionalidad compartida para rastrear las intenciones que subyacen al comportamiento social. Se introduce la noción de protoconcepto para caracterizar la naturaleza relacional y no conceptual de la lectura de mentes implícita. Se argumenta que los bebés emplean los protoconceptos para identificar expresiones faciales, verbales y conductuales en los demás y vincularlas con estados mentales.

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Citas

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