Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (1998)
Simposio

Sobre los distintos alcances del argumento de la teoría de modelos

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  • Carolina Sartorio
Carolina Sartorio
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e591

Publicado 1998-11-01

Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

I criticize what seems to be a common assumption of the precedent papers, namely, that the model-theoretic argument has similar consequences for the different realms of language. In particular, I argue that while the argument does not have serious consequences for natural languages, this is not the case with the language of mathematics.

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