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El argumento cosmológico Kalam y el infinito actual: ¿Es un pasado infinito imposible?

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  • Daniel Molina Torres
Daniel Molina Torres
Universidad Científica del Sur, Lima, Perú.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1125

Publicado 2025-06-26

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

Dentro de la variedad de argumentos cosmológicos, el más popular es el argumento cosmológico Kalam, el cual pretende demostrar una causa del comienzo del universo (esta causa, luego de diversos razonamientos, buscará ser identificada con Dios). La particularidad del Kalam en contraste a otros argumentos cosmológicos, es que este depende en sus premisas de la finitud del pasado, cuestión que ha sido defendida filosóficamente al ofrecer demostraciones a priori de la imposibilidad de un pasado infinito, particularmente: (i) la imposibilidad de un infinito actual, y (ii) la imposibilidad de formar un infinito actual mediante sucesión aditiva. Examinaré estos argumentos y mostraré que no son convincentes.

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