Pré-publicação
Artigos

O esforço ecológico e enativista radical para se livrar (ou domar) as ilusões perceptuais

Luis Alejandro Murillo Lara
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, Tunja, Colombia.

Publicado 2025-01-06

Palavras-chave

  • Ilusiones perceptuales,
  • Antirrepresentacionalismo,
  • Enactivismo Radical,
  • Enfoque Ecológico
  • Perceptual Illusions,
  • Anti-Representationalism,
  • Radical Enactivism,
  • Ecological Approach
  • ilusões perceptuais,
  • antirrepresentacionalismo,
  • enativismo radical,
  • abordagem ecológica

Resumo

Algumas abordagens antirrepresentacionalistas da cognição têm se tornado cada vez mais populares, e muitos de seus defensores as veem como promissoras de um novo paradigma para a ciência cognitiva. Neste manuscrito, concentro-me em duas dessas abordagens para argumentar que elas não contêm uma explicação adequada das ilusões perceptuais - e que talvez não possam fornecê-la. Minha alegação é que, sem um tratamento adequado de um fenômeno perceptual tão comum, elas dificilmente podem ser vistas como parte de um novo paradigma. Começo descrevendo o contexto em que essas abordagens surgiram e se desenvolveram e, na segunda parte, apresento três tratamentos de ilusões perceptuais provenientes das abordagens em questão. A terceira parte faz um desvio sobre a noção de ilusão perceptual, já que a avaliação dessas explicações das ilusões parece exigir isso. Em seguida, a quarta parte é dedicada à avaliação dessas explicações das ilusões, discutindo a introdução da linguagem normativa, o apelo a noções como propriedade “dependente da situação” e se uma definição proposta de ilusão se ajusta à nossa compreensão atual delas, bem como a rejeição de inferências de comportamento inadequado que parecem abdutivamente legítimas. Argumento que esses relatos de ilusões perceptuais não atingem seu objetivo.

Traduzido com a versão gratuita do tradutor - DeepL.com

Referências

  1. Aristotle (1984). On dreams (J. Beare, Trans.). In J. Barnes (Ed.), Complete works of Aristotle, vol. 1 (pp. 729-735). Princeton University Press.
  2. Ayer, A. (1940). The foundations of empirical knowledge. Macmillan.
  3. Bechtel, W. (2013). Philosophy of science: An overview for cognitive science. Psychology Press.
  4. Bermúdez, J., & Cahen, A. (2015, Fall). Nonconceptual mental content. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/content-nonconceptual/
  5. Brewer, B. (2013). Perception and its objects. Oxford University Press.
  6. Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press.
  7. Chemero, A. (2016). Sensorimotor empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(5-6), 138-152. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2016/00000023/f0020005/art00007
  8. Clark, A. (1998). Being there: Putting brain, body and world together again. MIT Press.
  9. Crane, T., & French, C. (2021, Fall). The problem of perception. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/perception-problem/
  10. Cussins, A. (1992). Content, embodiment and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails. Mind, 101(404), 651-688. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/101.404.651
  11. Dewey, J. (1896). The reflex arc concept in psychology. Psychological Review, 3(4), 357-370. ark:/13960/t6448b242
  12. Dewey, J. (1930). The quest for certainty: A study of the relation of knowledge and action. The Journal of Philosophy, 27(1), 14-25.
  13. Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), 429-452. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y
  14. Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. MIT Press.
  15. Faivre, D., & Schuler, D. (2008). Magnetotactic bacteria and magnetosomes. Chemical Reviews, 108(11), 4875-4898. https://doi.org/10.1021/cr078258w
  16. Favela, L., & Chemero, A. (2016). An ecological account of visual “illusions”. Florida Philosophical Review, 16(1), 68-93.
  17. Fish, W. (2009). Perception, hallucination, and illusion. Oxford University Press.
  18. Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Houghton Mifflin.
  19. Heck, R. (2000). Nonconceptual content and the “space of reasons”. Philosophical Review, 109(4), 483–523. https://doi.org/10.2307/2693622
  20. Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. MIT Press.
  21. Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. MIT Press.
  22. Johnson, M., Hayes, S., D’Esposito, M., & Raye, C. (2000). Confabulation. In L. Cermak (Ed.), Handbook of neuropsychology: Memory and its disorders (pp. 383-407). Elsevier Science.
  23. Kelley, L., & Endler, J. (2012). Illusions promote mating success in great bowerbirds. Science, 335(6066), 335-338. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1212443
  24. Kelley, L., & Kelley, J. (2014). Animal visual illusion and confusion: The importance of a perceptual perspective. Behavioral Ecology, 25(3), 450-463. https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/art118
  25. Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. D. Reidel.
  26. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Gallimard.
  27. Miłkowski, M. (2015). The hard problem of content: Solved (long ago). Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 41(1), 73-88. https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0021
  28. Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. MIT Press.
  29. Millikan, R. (1989). Biosemantics. The Journal of Philosophy, 86(6), 281-297. https://doi.org/10.2307/2027123
  30. Nanay, B. (2015). Perceptual content. In M. Matthen (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the philosophy of perception (pp. 153-167). Oxford University Press.
  31. Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst’s defense. Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 168-184.
  32. Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. MIT Press.
  33. Obonai, T. (1954). Induction effects in estimates of extent. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47(1), 57. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0057223
  34. O’Regan, K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 939-973. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01000115
  35. Parrish, A. (2021). Visual illusions: Insights from comparative cognition. In J. Anderson & H. Kuroshima (Eds.), Comparative cognition (pp. 15-30). Springer.
  36. Pitt, D. (2022, Fall). Mental representation. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/mental-representation/
  37. Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press.
  38. Sarcone, G. (2015). Dynamic Müller-Lyer illusion. Sarcone’s Studio. https://www.giannisarcone.com/Muller_lyer_illusion.html
  39. Schellenberg, S. (2008). The situation-dependency of perception. The Journal of Philosophy, 105(2), 55-84. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil200810525
  40. Shapiro, A., & Todorovic, D. (2017). Introduction. In A. Shapiro & D. Todorovic (Eds.), The Oxford compendium of visual illusions (pp. xix-xxiii). Oxford University Press.
  41. Skinner, B. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
  42. Soteriou, M. (2000). The particularity of visual perception. European Journal of Philosophy, 8(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00107
  43. Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. (2010). Enaction: Toward a new paradigm for cognitive science. MIT Press.
  44. Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind, 113(449), 57-94. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/113.449.57
  45. Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press.
  46. Vision, G. (2009). Fixing perceptual belief. The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(235), 292-314. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.566.x
  47. Wade, N. (2017). Early history of illusions. In A. Shapiro & D. Todorovic (Eds.), The Oxford compendium of visual illusions (pp. 3-37). Oxford University Press.
  48. Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017). The varieties of enactivism. Topoi, 36, 365-375. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6