v. 31 n. 2 (2011)
Artigos

Contenido perceptual, conceptos y conciencia fenoménica

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  • Francisco Pereira Gandarillas
Francisco Pereira Gandarillas
Universidad Alberto Hurtado
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2011.116

Publicado 2011-11-01

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

Algunos defensores del conceptualismo perceptual intentan bloquear el argumento noconceptualista de la riqueza de contenido afirmando que no hay percepción consciente sin atención. Para justificar esta afirmación los conceptualistas normalmente apelan a experimentos psicológicos, tales como la ceguera al cambio y la ceguera inatencional. En este artículo argumentaré que esta estrategia es insuficiente. Además sostendré, en base a recientes consideraciones teóricas y empíricas, que hay buenas razones para pensar que probablemente hay una forma de conciencia fenoménica visual más allá de los límites de la atención que no es accesible cognitivamente y menos aún estructurada conceptualmente.

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