v. 42 n. 1 (2022)
Notas críticas

Punishment, Consent, Value and Respect:: A Critique of David Alm

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  • Matías Parmigiani
Matías Parmigiani
Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales (CONICET - UNC) / Universidad Siglo 21, Córdoba, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.416

Publicado 2022-05-01

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

The present paper constitutes a critique of David Alm’s article “Punishment, Consent and Value”, in which it is argued that the consensual theory of punishment defended by C. S. Nino is false. Whilst Alm believes that this theory is grounded on an inadequate model of normative relations, here I will defend the hypothesis that such an assessment derives from an insufficient conception of human value and respect.

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