v. 40 n. Especial (2020): Lógica, lenguaje y representación. Homenaje a Alberto Moretti
Artigos

Lógica, justificación y normatividad

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  • Natalia Buacar
Natalia Buacar
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.431

Publicado 2020-12-15

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

Alberto Moretti en “La lógica y la trama de las cosas” presenta y defiende una concepción de la lógica según la cual existen principios lógicos que estructuran el lenguaje y, consecuentemente, el mundo. Este modo de entender la lógica ofrece una respuesta al problema de su normatividad, al tiempo que disuelve el problema de su justificación. En este trabajo, analizo críticamente esta mirada acerca de la lógica y propongo una concepción alternativa que permite vindicar la legitimidad de ambos problemas y darles una respuesta satisfactoria.

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