Towards an Extended Anti-exceptionalism: Practices, Revision and Adoption
Omar Vásquez
Published 2022-11-11
Keywords
- Adoption Problem,
- Anti-excepcionalism,
- Logica Docens,
- Logica Utens
- Problema de la Adopción,
- Antiexcepcionalismo,
- Logica docens,
- Logica utens
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The Adoption Problem (Padró 2015), according to which it is impossible to adopt a logic, prompts the idea that the practice of inferring takes priority over the conception of logic as a theory. This problem raises a challenge for the anti-exceptionalist conception of logic, which takes logic principles as mere hypotheses or beliefs subject to revision. In our view, the main issue of the anti-exceptionalist conception of logic has been to leave the question about the nature of logic as a practice open. But it is completely possible to answer this question under anti-exceptionalist lines. In this paper we develop a naturalistic conception of the practice of inferring which bridges this gap and answers the challenge raised by the Adoption Problem.
References
- Besson, C. (2019). Knowledge of logical generality and the possibility of deductive reasoning. En T. Chan & A. Nes (Eds.), Inference and consciousness. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy (pp. 172-196). Routledge.
- Boghossian, P. (2014). What is inference. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 169(1), 1-18.
- Boghossian, P., & Wright, C. (2020). Kripke, Quine, the ‘adoption problem’ and the empirical revision of logic. Manuscrito.
- Devitt, M. & Roberts, J. R. (2020). The adoption problem in logic: A quinean picture. Manuscrito.
- Hjortland, O. T. (2017). Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 631-658. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0701-8
- Hjortland, O. (2019). What counts as evidence for a logical theory? Australasian Journal of Logic, 16(7), 250-282. https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5912
- Kripke, S. (2021). The question of logic. Manuscrito aceptado en Mind para su publicación.
- Murzi, J., & Carrara, M. (2015). Paradox and logical revision: A short introduction. Topoi, 34(1), 7-14. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9286-z
- Padró, R. (2015). What the tortoise said to Kripke: The adoption problem and the epistemology of logic, Ph.D. thesis. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/603/
- Padro, R. (2021). The adoption problem and the epistemology of logic. Manuscrito aceptado en Mind para su publicación.
- Priest, G. (2014). Revising logic. En P. Rush (Ed.), The metaphysics of logic (pp. 211-223). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139626279.016
- Priest, G. (2016). Logical disputes and the a priori. Logique et Analyse, 236, 347-366. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/LEA.236.0.3186061
- Quine, W.V.O. (1951). Main trends in recent philosophy: Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60(1), 20-43. https://doi.org/doi:10.2307/2181906
- Quine, W.V.O. (1986). Philosophy of logic (2nd ed.). Harvard University Press.
- Ryle, G. (1945). Knowing how and knowing that: the presidential address. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46, new series, 1-16.
- Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Hutchinson.
- Williamson, T. (2017). Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology. En B. Armour-Garb (Ed.), Reflections on the liar (pp. 325-346). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0013
- Williamson, T. (2021). Accepting a logic, accepting a theory. Manuscrito.
- Wright, C. (2004). Intuition, entitlement and the epistemology of logical laws. Dialectica, 58(1), 155-175. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42970835