Vol. 35 No. 1 (2015): Homenaje a Carlos S. Nino I
Articles

The Epistemic Conception of Deliberative Democracy: A critique

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  • Mariano Garreta Leclercq
Mariano Garreta Leclercq
Universidad de Buenos Aires - CONICET - CIF - Grupo de Filosofía Política
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2015.46

Published 2015-05-01

Keywords

  • Deliberation,
  • Justification,
  • Morality,
  • Legitimacy,
  • Liberalism
  • Deliberación,
  • Justificación,
  • Moral,
  • Legitimidad,
  • Liberalismo
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Abstract

This paper posits some objections against the deliberative conception of democracy developed by Carlos Nino. According to Nino, the value of democratic deliberation lies, basically, in its epistemic virtues. Public deliberation increases the probability that the political system will arrive at the correct decisions. We shall argue that the Argentinean philosopher fails to prove that his proposal is a solution to purported weaknesses in John Rawls’ and Jürgen Habermas’ positions in the field of moral epistemology. We shall try to demonstrate that the conception of deliberation posited by nino cannot be applied successfully in the context of moral, philosophical or religious reasonable pluralism that characterizes liberal contemporary democracies. Finally, we offer an outline of an alternative conception -practical and moral, non epistemic- of the value of democratic procedures and about the nature of political legitimacy.

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