v. 32 n. 1 (2012)
Simpósio

Anti-Realism and Infinitary Proofs

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  • Diego Tajer
Diego Tajer
Universidad de Buenos Aires / CONICET
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2012.108

Publicado 2012-05-01

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

In the discussion about Yablo’s Paradox, a debated topic is the status of infinitary proofs. It is usually considered that, although a realist could (with some effort) accept them, an anti-realist could not do it at all. In this paper I will argue that there are plausible reasons for an anti-realist to accept infinitary proofs and rules of inference.

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