v. 40 n. 2 (2020)
Artigos

Las Lógicas Mixtas como escape al Problema del Colapso y al Desafío de Quine

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  • Joaquín Santiago Toranzo Calderón
Joaquín Santiago Toranzo Calderón
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina / Universidad Tecnológica Nacional, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.319

Publicado 2020-11-01

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

En este trabajo presentaré una forma de evitar los problemas más recurrentes en cierta versión del pluralismo lógico, aquella que defiende que incluso considerando un lenguaje fijo existen múltiples sistemas lógicos legítimos. Para ello, será necesario considerar los puntos de partida del programa pluralista y explicitar los problemas que de ellos surgen, principalmente el Desafío de Quine y el Problema del Colapso. Luego, propondré una modificación respecto de lo que se entiende por consecuencia lógica, para poder considerar una familia de sistemas lógicos, las lógicas mixtas, que abarcan tanto a las lógicas puras como a las impuras. Finalmente, mostraré que con una interpretación razonable del formalismo se puede eludir aquellos problemas a la vez que se respeta el espíritu del programa pluralista.

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