v. 40 n. 1 (2020)
Artigos

Las soluciones subestructurales a las paradojas y el problema de la dependencia

Bruno Da Ré
IIF-SADAF-CONICET / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Publicado 2020-05-01

Resumo

En los últimos años se han desarrollado diversas soluciones subestructurales a las paradojas semánticas. En particular, se han postulado teorías no transitivas, no contractivas, no reflexivas y, recientemente, no monotónicas. Sin embargo, cuando dichas soluciones son presentadas mediante cálculos de secuentes surge el problema de la dependencia. En pocas palabras, este problema consiste en que no es posible separar las reglas estructurales de la formulación de las otras reglas del cálculo. En este artículo, presentaré este problema y mostraré que, de hecho, es posible construir un cálculo que no contiene ninguna regla estructural de manera explícita y que, sin embargo, resulta trivial al agregarle un predicado veritativo transparente con ciertos axiomas. Luego, delimitaré los alcances de dicho problema, concluyendo que la metodología correcta para seleccionar una solución subestructural a las paradojas semánticas debe basarse en argumentos filosóficos y, tal vez, en un estudio empírico sobre el fenómeno de la paradojicidad y no en la comparación de derivaciones en cálculos particulares.

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