Vol. 43 Núm. 1 (2023)
Artículos

Fuerza, contenido y la metafísica del juicio

Javier Vidal
Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Chile

Publicado 2023-05-01

Palabras clave

  • Grounding,
  • Judgement,
  • Predication,
  • Frege-Geach Problem,
  • Proposition
  • Fundación,
  • Juicio,
  • Predicación,
  • Problema Frege-Geach,
  • Proposición

Resumen

El problema Frege-Geach consiste en explicar que el mismo contenido proposicional figure tanto afirmado como no afirmado en diferentes contextos. Se trata de un desafío mayor para una concepción según la cual una proposición predicativa es inherentemente afirmativa. Justamente Peter Hanks ha defendido recientemente dicha concepción al sostener que un acto de predicación es un juicio. Entonces se enfrenta al problema Frege-Geach argumentando que algunos contextos cancelan el compromiso normal con la verdad. Pero según varios críticos, hay un dilema aquí: o bien la cancelación nos deja con algo menos que una predicación o bien nos deja con la predicación menos el compromiso. En este artículo, propongo una aproximación al dilema que apela a la naturaleza no afirmativa de las proposiciones pero salva la estrecha conexión entre la predicación y el juicio. También intento explicar esa estrecha conexión desarrollando una metafísica del juicio en términos de fundación entre hechos, con los hechos judicativos solo fundados parcialmente en los hechos predicativos.

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