Vol. 43 No. 1 (2023)
Articles

Force, Content, and the Metaphysics of Judgement

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  • Javier Vidal
Javier Vidal
Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2023.468

Published 2023-05-01

Keywords

  • Grounding,
  • Judgement,
  • Predication,
  • Frege-Geach Problem,
  • Proposition
  • Fundación,
  • Juicio,
  • Predicación,
  • Problema Frege-Geach,
  • Proposición
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Abstract

The Frege-Geach problem relates to give an account of the same propositional content appearing in different contexts both affirmed and not affirmed. It is a major challenge for a view in which a predicative proposition is inherently committal. Fairly, Peter Hanks has recently supported such a view by holding that an act of predication is a judgement. He then faces the Frege-Geach problem by arguing that some contexts cancel the normal commitment with the truth. But according to several critics, there is a dilemma here of either cancellation leaving us with something minus predication or leaving us with predication minus commitment. In this paper, I propose an approach to the dilemma that appeals to the non-committal nature of propositions but saves the close link between predication and judgement. I also try to explain such a close link by developing a metaphysics of judgement in terms of grounding between facts, with facts about judgement only partially grounded in facts about predication.

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