The Copernican Revolution as a Problematic Example of Theoretical Change: On “La verdad y el éxito de la ciencia: A propósito de un artículo de P. Kyle Stanford” by Manuel Comesaña

Abstract

In his article “La verdad y el éxito de la ciencia: A propósito de un artículo de P. Kyle Stanford” (2002), Manuel Comesaña addresses fundamental questions about the nature and success of science, taking P. Kyle Stanford’s article as a reference for his critical analysis. Although the central focus of both works is not specifically on the Copernican Revolution, it is relevant to analyse how both authors use this historical example from astronomy to illustrate their metaphysical commitments. Rigorous analysis of this historiographical episode will provide better foundations for the broader discussion of the realism-anti-realism debate.  It is for this reason that we will undertake a critical study and subsequent correction of the way in which both authors set up their accounts to exemplify their positions. What we have come to contribute with our commentary is not a position that attempts to account for the success of the anti-realist proposals that the authors are interested in debating, but rather we intend to shed light on the treatment given to the historical case in order to clarify certain obscure points in the debate.