Vol. 44 No. 2 (2024)
Articles

David Hume on the Thesis of the Transparency of the Phenomena of Consciousness

PDF (Português (Brasil))
  • Vinícius França Freitas,
  • Carlota Salgadinho Ferreira
Vinícius França Freitas
Universidade Federal de ABC, Santo André, Brasil.
Carlota Salgadinho Ferreira
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1058

Published 2024-11-08

Keywords

  • History of Philosophy,
  • David Hume,
  • Consciousness,
  • Transparency,
  • Mind
  • História da Filosofia,
  • David Hume,
  • Consciência,
  • Transparência,
  • Mente
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

This article puts forward two hypotheses about David Hume’s position on the epistemic status of consciousness. Firstly, it is argued that Hume does not offer any explicit argument in favor of the thesis that the mind cannot be mistaken about a mental state of which it is conscious, and some possible interpretations that could offer this argument are questioned. Secondly, it is argued that Hume is committed to the thesis that the mind is conscious of all its mental phenomena as they occur, and the passages in which the philosopher seems to refer to non-conscious mental operations — which would contradict that thesis — are explained on the basis of a theory of degrees of consciousness according to the vividness of perceptions.

PDF (Português (Brasil))

References

  1. Ainslie, D. C. (2012). Hume, a Scottish Locke? Comments on Terence Penelhum’s Hume. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42(S1), 161-170. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44814629
  2. Audi, R. (1974). The limits of self-knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4(2), 253-267. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230503
  3. Bonjour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Harvard University Press.
  4. Broughton, J. (2008). Self-knowledge. Em J. Broughton e J. Carriero (Eds.), A companion to Descartes (pp. 179-195). Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470696439.ch11
  5. Calvente, S. (2021). Contra una interpretación reduccionista del método experimental de David Hume. Kriterion, 151, 55-78. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-512X2021n15103sc
  6. Calvente, S. (2022). ‘The father of the experimental philosophy of the human mind’: Descartes and the Scottish Enlightenment’s moral philosophers. Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 20(3), 217-235. https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/jsp.2022.0337
  7. Costelloe, T. (2018). The imagination in Hume’s philosophy: The canvas of the mind. Edinburgh University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781474436410
  8. Descartes, R. (2004). Meditações sobre filosofia primeira (F. Castilho, Trad.). UNICAMP.
  9. Descartes, R. (2006). Meditations, Objections and Replies (R. Ariew & D. Cress, Eds. e Trads.). Hackett Publishing Company.
  10. Freitas, V. (2022). O ceticismo de David Hume na leitura de Thomas Reid. Filosofia Unisinos, 23(3), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.01
  11. Freitas, V. (2023). A noção humiana de ‘consciência’ no Apêndice ao Tratado da natureza humana. Kriterion, 154, 191-211. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-512X2023n15409vff
  12. Garrett, D. (2008). Hume’s theory of ideas. Em E. S. Radcliffe (Ed.), A companion to Hume (pp. 41-57). Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470696583.ch2
  13. Hansen, S. (1988). Hume’s impressions of belief. Hume Studies, 14(2), 277-304. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0497
  14. Hume, D. (IEH) (2004). Investigações sobre o Entendimento Humano e sobre os Princípios da Moral (J. O. de A. Marques, Trad.). UNESP.
  15. Hume, D. (T) (2001). Tratado da natureza humana (D. Danowski, Trad.). UNESP.
  16. Husserl, E. (1970). Philosophie première: Histoire critique des idées (1a. ed.). PUF.
  17. McDonough, J. (2002). Hume’s account of memory. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 10(1), 71-87. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608780110099877
  18. Noxon, J. (1969). Senses of identity in Hume’s Treatise. Dialogue, 8(3), 367-384.
  19. Owen, D. (2009). Hume and the mechanics of mind: Impressions, ideas, and association. The Cambridge companion to Hume (2a. ed., pp. 70-104). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521859868.003
  20. Penelhum, T. (2012). Hume, Locke and conciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42(S1), 198-203. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44814632
  21. Qu, H. (2015). Hume on mental transparency. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(4), 576-601. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12125
  22. Porchat, O. (1987). Ceticismo e mundo exterior. Discurso, 16, 33-68. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.1987.37919
  23. Reid, T. (1997). Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense (D. Brookes, Ed.). Edinburgh University Press.
  24. Reid, T. (2002). Essays on the intellectual powers of man (Derek Brookes, Ed.). Edinburgh University Press.
  25. Salgadinho, C. (2021). Ideias relativas, conceptibilidade e ceticismo na teoria causal de Hume. Sképsis, 22, 21-39.
  26. Stevenson, G. P. (1998). Humean self-consciousness explained. Hume Studies, 24(1), 95-129. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0153
  27. Thiel, U. (1994). Hume’s notions of consciousness and reflection in context. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2(2), 75-115. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608789408570900
  28. Thiel, U. (2011). The early modern subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from Descartes to Hume. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.001.0001
  29. Traiger, S. (1985). Hume on finding an impression of the self. Hume Studies, 11(1), 47-68. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0002
  30. Waxman, W. (1994). Hume’s theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511554520
  31. Yandell, K. (1992). Continuity, consciousness, and identity in Hume’s philosophy. Hume Studies, 18(2), 255-274. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0441