Vol. 30 No. 2 (2010)
Articles

El debate entre externistas e internistas acerca de la racionalidad inferencial

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  • Manuel Pérez Otero
Manuel Pérez Otero
Universidad de Barcelona / LOGOS, España
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2010.128

Published 2010-11-01

Keywords

  • Content externalism,
  • Inferential rationality,
  • Boghossian,
  • Twin Earth,
  • Singular terms
  • Externismo,
  • Racionalidad inferencial,
  • Boghossian,
  • Tierra Gemela,
  • Términos singulares
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Abstract

Several arguments have been presented against content externalism. I deal here with one of these arguments, which -like some others- comes from Boghossian. It is related to our inferential rationality (to use his terms). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. This conclusion is not justified. The problem posed by Boghossian constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, insofar as Boghossian's scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen -against Boghossian's original intention- as providing additional evidence for content externalism.

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