Vol. 30 No. 2 (2010)
Articles

El argumento modal de Moore contra el escepticismo

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  • Javier Vilanova Arias
Javier Vilanova Arias
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2010.130

Published 2010-11-01

Keywords

  • George E. Moore,
  • Scepticism,
  • Modalities
  • George E. Moore,
  • Escepticismo,
  • Modalidades
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Abstract

We describe four arguments from George E. Moore against the sceptic: self-reference, common sense, rational choice and modal arguments. The modal argument accuses the sceptic of committing a fallacy of ambiguity. By analysing this argument, we extract an important lesson from Moore for contemporary epistemology

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