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Dominant Modern Ethical Theories and the Problem of Moral Alienation

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  • Daniela Alegría
Daniela Alegría
Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1329

Published 2026-07-08

Keywords

  • Alienación moral,
  • Imparcialidad,
  • Impersonalidad,
  • Razones para actuar
  • Moral alienation,
  • Impartiality,
  • Impersonality,
  • Reasons for action
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

This article argues that Kantian ethics and rule utilitarianism do not generate moral alienation, whereas act utilitarianism does. The central thesis is that the problem is not impartiality, as is often alleged, but impersonality. When an agent acts from an impersonal standpoint, the right action appears alien to them, and moral alienation thereby emerges. By contrast, Kantian ethics and rule utilitarianism, though impartial theories, admit agent-relative reasons—reasons specified by universal principles that nevertheless refer, in an ineliminable way, to the agent’s own traits, projects, and relationships. In other words, they incorporate a personal standpoint that allows the agent, at least in part, to determine what is right, wrong, and permissible in light of their life, position in the world, and ties to others. In act utilitarianism, by contrast, reasons are agent-neutral—they depend on what everyone ought to value independently of, for example, personal relationships. The adoption of this impersonal standpoint explains act utilitarianism’s propensity to produce moral alienation.

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