Published 2016-11-01
Keywords
- Concepto de primera persona,
- Juicio de orden superior,
- Condición de posesión,
- TeorÃa de la determinación,
- Peacocke
- First-person Concept,
- Higher-order Judgement,
- Possession Condition,
- Theory of the Determination,
- Peacocke
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Abstract
Following Peacocke’s approach to the nature of concepts, this paper presents a possession condition theory of the first-person concept. I propose that such a possession condition is a matter of, necessarily, one’s being disposed to make a higher-order judgement with the content <I am the thinker that I am F> just when one has a conscious thought with the content <I am F>. Accordingly, I try to motivate and defend this view responding to supposed counterexamples. In addition, I provide a theory of the determination of the semantic value as to how that possession condition individuates the first-person concept by giving the condition that someone has to satisfy in order to be its referent.
References
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Mota Pinto, S. (2009), Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, Barcelona, Anthropos.
O’Brien, l. (2007), Self-Knowing Agents, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1992), A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1997), “Concepts without Words”, en Heck, r. (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-33.
Peacocke, C. (1999), Being Known, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (2004), “Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure”, Mind & Language, 19 (1), pp. 85-98.
Peacocke, C. (2007), “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)”, en Cohen, J. y Mclaughlin, B. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 358-376.
Peacocke, C. (2008), Truly Understood, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (2010), “Self-Consciousness”, Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 68 (4), pp. 522-551.
Peacocke, C. (2014), The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Rives, B. (2009), “Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases”, Philosophical Studies, 144 (2), pp. 211-238.
Rosenthal, D. (2005), Consciousness and Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Stephens, G. l. y Graham, G. (2000), When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Vidal, J. (2014), “Creencia de primera persona, conciencia y la paradoja de Eroom”, Crítica, 46 (138), pp. 37-64.
Vidal, J. (2015), “Pensamientos de se y mente consciente”, Theoria, 30 (1), pp. 117-136.
Baker, l. r. (2013), Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bayne, T. (2010), The Unity of Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, J. l. (1998), The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Campbell, J. (2002), “The Ownership of Thoughts”, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9 (1), pp. 35-39.
Davis, W. A. (2005), “Concepts and Epistemic Individuation”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX (2), pp. 290-325.
Dummett, m. (1991), The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Londres, Duckworth.
Finkelstein, D. (2003), Expression and the Inner, Harvard, Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1987), Psychosemantics, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (2004), “Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the 20th Century”, Mind & Language, 19 (1), pp. 29-47.
Gallagher, S. (2000), “Self-reference and Schizophrenia: a Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, en Zahavi, D. (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experiences, Ámsterdam y Filadelfia, John Benjamins, pp. 203-239.
Gallagher, S. y Zahavi, D. (2013), La mente fenomenológica, Madrid, Alianza.
Goldman, A. (2001), “Review of Being Known”, Mind, 110, pp. 1105-1109.
Lewis, D. (1979), “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, 88, pp. 513-543.
Martin, M. G. F. (1995), “Bodily Awareness: a Sense of Ownership”, en Bermúdez, J. l., Marcel, J. l. y Eilan, n. (eds.), The Body and the Self, Cambridge, The MIT Press, pp. 267-290.
Moran, r. (2001), Authority and Estrangement: an Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Morgan, D. (2015), “The Demonstrative model of First-Person Thought”, Philosophical Studies, 172, pp. 1795-1811.
Mota Pinto, S. (2009), Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, Barcelona, Anthropos.
O’Brien, l. (2007), Self-Knowing Agents, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1992), A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1997), “Concepts without Words”, en Heck, r. (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-33.
Peacocke, C. (1999), Being Known, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (2004), “Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure”, Mind & Language, 19 (1), pp. 85-98.
Peacocke, C. (2007), “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)”, en Cohen, J. y Mclaughlin, B. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 358-376.
Peacocke, C. (2008), Truly Understood, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (2010), “Self-Consciousness”, Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 68 (4), pp. 522-551.
Peacocke, C. (2014), The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Rives, B. (2009), “Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases”, Philosophical Studies, 144 (2), pp. 211-238.
Rosenthal, D. (2005), Consciousness and Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Stephens, G. l. y Graham, G. (2000), When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Vidal, J. (2014), “Creencia de primera persona, conciencia y la paradoja de Eroom”, Crítica, 46 (138), pp. 37-64.
Vidal, J. (2015), “Pensamientos de se y mente consciente”, Theoria, 30 (1), pp. 117-136.