Published 2016-11-01
Keywords
- Mentes animales,
- Contenidos mentales,
- Relación lenguaje-pensamiento
- Animal Minds,
- Mental Contents,
- Language-Thought Relationship
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Abstract
When we try to find a precise linguistic expression to the contents of animal thoughts we face persisting difficulties. In this paper, I will evaluate two alternative explanations of this phenomenon: the explanation from unfamiliar contents and the explanation from nonlinguistic format. Beck (2013) rejects the former and endorses the latter. I will begin by presenting objections against Beck’s reasons to reject the explanation from unfamiliar contents. Afterwards, I will argue, against Beck, that even if some difficulties to put into words the contents of animal thoughts may be due to their nonlinguistic format, others have a different source. Thus, I will suggest that if we want to reach a more encompassing understanding of these difficulties, we need to develop a dual explanation which incorporates both differences in formats and differences in contents.
References
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Saidel, E. (2009), “Animal Thoughts”, en R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (2004), La mente: Una breve introducción, Bogotá, Norma.
Andrews, K. (2015), The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, Nueva York, Routledge.
Bandia, P. (2008/2014), Translation as Reparation, Nueva York, Routledge.
Beck, J. (2012a), “Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?, Philosophy Compass, 7, pp. 218-229.
Beck, J. (2012b), “The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought”, Mind, 121, pp. 563-600.
Beck, J. (2013), “Why We Can’t Say What Animals Think”, Philosophical Psychology, 26, pp. 520-546.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2003), Thinking without Words, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2007), “Negation, Contrariety and Practical Reasoning: Comments on Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (3), pp. 663-669.
Camp, E. (2009), “Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Stimulus independence and The Generality Constraint”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78 (2), pp. 275-311.
Camp, E. (2007), “Thinking with Maps”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21, pp. 145-182.
Carey, S. (2009), The Origin of Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2004), “On Being Simple-minded”, American Philosophical Quaterly, 41, pp. 205-220.
Carruthers, P. (2009), “Invertebrate Concepts Confront the Generality Constraint (and Win)”, en Lurz, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Animals Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Cheney, D. y Seyfarth, R. (1990), How Monkeys See the World?, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Clayton, N. (2006), “The Rationality of Animal Memory: The Cognition of Catching”, en Hurley, S. y Mathews, N. (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2001), Elements of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2009), “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Philosophical Quaterly, 59, pp. 452-469.
Danón, L. (2015), “Estados cognitivos de magnitudes analógicas y conceptos”, en Aguilera, M., Danón, L. y Scotto, C. (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición, Córdoba, Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
Dennett, D. (1996/2000), Tipos de mentes, Madrid, Debate.
Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1998), Conceptos: Donde la ciencia cognitiva se equivocó, Barcelona, Gedisa.
Fodor, J. (2007), “The Revenge of the Given”, en Mclaughlin, B. P. y Cohen, D. J. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 105-116.
Fodor, J. (2008), LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Glock, H. J. (2008), La mente de los animales: Problemas conceptuales, Oviedo, KRK Ediciones.
Glodjović, A. (2010), “Translation as a Mean of Cross-cultural Communication: some Problems in Literary Texts Translations”, Facta Universitatis, 8 (2), pp. 141-151.
Haugeland, J. (1998), “Representational Genera”, en Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Hurley, S. (2003), “Animal Action in the Space of reasons”, Mind and Language, 18 (3), pp. 231-256.
Jamieson, D. (2009), “What Do Animals Think?”, en Lurz, R. (ed.) The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Kosslyn, S., Thompson, W. H. L. y Ganis, G. (2006), The Case for Mental Imagery, Nueva York, Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1982), “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, pp. 669-688.
Laurence, S. y Margolis, E. (1999), “Concepts and Cognitive Science”, en Margolis, E. y Laurence, S. (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
McIntyre, A. (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.
Millikan, R. (2007), “Reply to Bermúdez”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (3), pp. 670-673.
Morales, J. (2011), “razonamiento animal: negación y representaciones de ausencia”, Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 3, pp. 20-33.
Murphy, G. (2002), The Big Book of Concepts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Owings, D. (2002), “The Cognitive Defender: How Ground Squirrels Asses their Predators”, en Bekoff, M., Allen, C. y Burghardt, G. (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Ristau, C. (1991), “Aspects of the Cognitive Ethology of an Injury-feigning Bird, the Pipping Plover”, en Ristau, C. A. y Marler, P. (eds.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, Hillsdale, Lawerence Erlbaum.
Saidel, E. (2009), “Animal Thoughts”, en R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (2004), La mente: Una breve introducción, Bogotá, Norma.