Publicado 2016-11-01
Palabras clave
- Mentes animales,
- Contenidos mentales,
- Relación lenguaje-pensamiento
- Animal Minds,
- Mental Contents,
- Language-Thought Relationship
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Resumen
Nuestros intentos por hallar palabras que capturen de modo preciso los contenidos de los pensamientos de los animales suelen tropezar con dificultades persistentes. En este trabajo evaluaré dos explicaciones de este fenómeno discutidas por Beck (2013): la explicación basada en el carácter poco familiar de los contenidos animales –que él rechaza– y la basada en diferencias de formato –que resulta su favorita–. En primer lugar, objetaré las razones por las cuales Beck descarta la explicación basada en el carácter poco familiar de los contenidos. En segundo lugar argumentaré que, aunque algunas dificultades para expresar lingüísticamente los pensamientos animales pueden surgir por diferencias de formato, hay otras que no parecen deberse a este factor. Luego sugeriré que, a fin de comprender adecuadamente el problema que nos ocupa, deberíamos elaborar una explicación dual que apele, en algunos casos, a las diferencias de contenido y, en otros, a las diferencias de formato.
Citas
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Andrews, K. (2015), The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, Nueva York, Routledge.
Bandia, P. (2008/2014), Translation as Reparation, Nueva York, Routledge.
Beck, J. (2012a), “Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?, Philosophy Compass, 7, pp. 218-229.
Beck, J. (2012b), “The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought”, Mind, 121, pp. 563-600.
Beck, J. (2013), “Why We Can’t Say What Animals Think”, Philosophical Psychology, 26, pp. 520-546.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2003), Thinking without Words, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2007), “Negation, Contrariety and Practical Reasoning: Comments on Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (3), pp. 663-669.
Camp, E. (2009), “Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Stimulus independence and The Generality Constraint”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78 (2), pp. 275-311.
Camp, E. (2007), “Thinking with Maps”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21, pp. 145-182.
Carey, S. (2009), The Origin of Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2004), “On Being Simple-minded”, American Philosophical Quaterly, 41, pp. 205-220.
Carruthers, P. (2009), “Invertebrate Concepts Confront the Generality Constraint (and Win)”, en Lurz, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Animals Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Cheney, D. y Seyfarth, R. (1990), How Monkeys See the World?, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Clayton, N. (2006), “The Rationality of Animal Memory: The Cognition of Catching”, en Hurley, S. y Mathews, N. (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2001), Elements of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2009), “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Philosophical Quaterly, 59, pp. 452-469.
Danón, L. (2015), “Estados cognitivos de magnitudes analógicas y conceptos”, en Aguilera, M., Danón, L. y Scotto, C. (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición, Córdoba, Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
Dennett, D. (1996/2000), Tipos de mentes, Madrid, Debate.
Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1998), Conceptos: Donde la ciencia cognitiva se equivocó, Barcelona, Gedisa.
Fodor, J. (2007), “The Revenge of the Given”, en Mclaughlin, B. P. y Cohen, D. J. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 105-116.
Fodor, J. (2008), LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Glock, H. J. (2008), La mente de los animales: Problemas conceptuales, Oviedo, KRK Ediciones.
Glodjović, A. (2010), “Translation as a Mean of Cross-cultural Communication: some Problems in Literary Texts Translations”, Facta Universitatis, 8 (2), pp. 141-151.
Haugeland, J. (1998), “Representational Genera”, en Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Hurley, S. (2003), “Animal Action in the Space of reasons”, Mind and Language, 18 (3), pp. 231-256.
Jamieson, D. (2009), “What Do Animals Think?”, en Lurz, R. (ed.) The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Kosslyn, S., Thompson, W. H. L. y Ganis, G. (2006), The Case for Mental Imagery, Nueva York, Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1982), “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, pp. 669-688.
Laurence, S. y Margolis, E. (1999), “Concepts and Cognitive Science”, en Margolis, E. y Laurence, S. (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
McIntyre, A. (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.
Millikan, R. (2007), “Reply to Bermúdez”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (3), pp. 670-673.
Morales, J. (2011), “razonamiento animal: negación y representaciones de ausencia”, Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 3, pp. 20-33.
Murphy, G. (2002), The Big Book of Concepts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Owings, D. (2002), “The Cognitive Defender: How Ground Squirrels Asses their Predators”, en Bekoff, M., Allen, C. y Burghardt, G. (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Ristau, C. (1991), “Aspects of the Cognitive Ethology of an Injury-feigning Bird, the Pipping Plover”, en Ristau, C. A. y Marler, P. (eds.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, Hillsdale, Lawerence Erlbaum.
Saidel, E. (2009), “Animal Thoughts”, en R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (2004), La mente: Una breve introducción, Bogotá, Norma.
Andrews, K. (2015), The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, Nueva York, Routledge.
Bandia, P. (2008/2014), Translation as Reparation, Nueva York, Routledge.
Beck, J. (2012a), “Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?, Philosophy Compass, 7, pp. 218-229.
Beck, J. (2012b), “The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought”, Mind, 121, pp. 563-600.
Beck, J. (2013), “Why We Can’t Say What Animals Think”, Philosophical Psychology, 26, pp. 520-546.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2003), Thinking without Words, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2007), “Negation, Contrariety and Practical Reasoning: Comments on Millikan’s Varieties of Meaning”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (3), pp. 663-669.
Camp, E. (2009), “Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Stimulus independence and The Generality Constraint”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78 (2), pp. 275-311.
Camp, E. (2007), “Thinking with Maps”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21, pp. 145-182.
Carey, S. (2009), The Origin of Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2004), “On Being Simple-minded”, American Philosophical Quaterly, 41, pp. 205-220.
Carruthers, P. (2009), “Invertebrate Concepts Confront the Generality Constraint (and Win)”, en Lurz, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Animals Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Cheney, D. y Seyfarth, R. (1990), How Monkeys See the World?, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Clayton, N. (2006), “The Rationality of Animal Memory: The Cognition of Catching”, en Hurley, S. y Mathews, N. (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2001), Elements of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (2009), “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Philosophical Quaterly, 59, pp. 452-469.
Danón, L. (2015), “Estados cognitivos de magnitudes analógicas y conceptos”, en Aguilera, M., Danón, L. y Scotto, C. (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición, Córdoba, Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
Dennett, D. (1996/2000), Tipos de mentes, Madrid, Debate.
Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1998), Conceptos: Donde la ciencia cognitiva se equivocó, Barcelona, Gedisa.
Fodor, J. (2007), “The Revenge of the Given”, en Mclaughlin, B. P. y Cohen, D. J. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 105-116.
Fodor, J. (2008), LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Glock, H. J. (2008), La mente de los animales: Problemas conceptuales, Oviedo, KRK Ediciones.
Glodjović, A. (2010), “Translation as a Mean of Cross-cultural Communication: some Problems in Literary Texts Translations”, Facta Universitatis, 8 (2), pp. 141-151.
Haugeland, J. (1998), “Representational Genera”, en Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Hurley, S. (2003), “Animal Action in the Space of reasons”, Mind and Language, 18 (3), pp. 231-256.
Jamieson, D. (2009), “What Do Animals Think?”, en Lurz, R. (ed.) The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Kosslyn, S., Thompson, W. H. L. y Ganis, G. (2006), The Case for Mental Imagery, Nueva York, Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1982), “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, pp. 669-688.
Laurence, S. y Margolis, E. (1999), “Concepts and Cognitive Science”, en Margolis, E. y Laurence, S. (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
McIntyre, A. (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.
Millikan, R. (2007), “Reply to Bermúdez”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (3), pp. 670-673.
Morales, J. (2011), “razonamiento animal: negación y representaciones de ausencia”, Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 3, pp. 20-33.
Murphy, G. (2002), The Big Book of Concepts, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Owings, D. (2002), “The Cognitive Defender: How Ground Squirrels Asses their Predators”, en Bekoff, M., Allen, C. y Burghardt, G. (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Ristau, C. (1991), “Aspects of the Cognitive Ethology of an Injury-feigning Bird, the Pipping Plover”, en Ristau, C. A. y Marler, P. (eds.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, Hillsdale, Lawerence Erlbaum.
Saidel, E. (2009), “Animal Thoughts”, en R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (2004), La mente: Una breve introducción, Bogotá, Norma.