Articles
Animals between Mind and World: McDowell´s Philosophy and the Re-Enchantment of Nature
Published 2018-05-01
Keywords
- John McDowell,
- Second Nature,
- Cognitive Ethology
- John McDowell,
- Segunda naturaleza,
- EtologÃa cognitiva
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Abstract
The paper discusses the philosophy of John McDowell in relation to the recent research in animal cognition. Firstly, it introduces the liberal or relaxed naturalism put forward by this author in Mind and World, taking into account the threshold of the modern natural sciences and the way McDowell places “mere animals” in nature. Secondly, it features two problems of this proposal: its unstable character and the fact that non-human animals do not have a proper place in it –at least from the viewpoint of cognitive ethology. Thirdly, it argues that these problems do not arise if one considers that nature is re-enchanted by the recent ethology itself.
References
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McDowell, J. (2008), “Responses” en Lindgaard, J. (ed.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 200-267.
McDowell, J. H. (2009), Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Mulcahy, N. J. y Call, J. (2006), “Apes Save Tools for Future Use”, Science, 312 (5776), pp. 1038-1040.
Newen, A. y Bartels, A. (2007), “Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts”, Philosophical Psycology, 20 (3), pp. 283-308.
Parker, S. T., Mitchell, R. W. y Boccia, M. L. (eds.) (2006). Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Plotnik, J. M., de Waal, F. B. M. y Reiss, D. (2006), “Self-Recognition in an Asian Elephant”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103 (45), pp. 17053-17057.
Povinelli, D. J. y Vonk, J. (2003), “Chimpanzee Minds: Suspiciously Human?”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7 (4), pp. 157-160.
Sellars, W. (1956/1997), Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Skidelsky, L. (2016), Representaciones mentales: Donde la filosofía de la mente y la filosofía de la ciencia cognitiva se equivocaron, Buenos Aires, Eudeba.
Tomasello, M. y Call, J. (1997), Primate Cognition, Nueva York, Oxford University Press.
Townsend, S. W. y Manser, M. B. (2013), “Functionally Referential Communication in Mammals: The Past, Present and the Future”, Ethology, 119 (1), pp. 1-11.
Weber, Max (1922), “Wissenschaft als Beruf, en Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre”, Tubinga, J. C. B. Mohr, pp. 524-555.
Wheeler, B. C. y Fischer, J. (2012), “Functionally Referential Signals: A Promising Paradigm whose Time has passed”, Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 21 (5), pp. 195-205.
Wild, M. (2008), Tierphilosophie zur Einführung, Hamburgo, Junius.
Wild, M. (2010), Biosemantik. Repräsentation, Intentionalität, Norm, Tesis de habilitación en la Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Recuperado de https://www.academia.edu/2095553/Biosemantik._Repräsentation_Intentionalität_Norm_2010 (30-03-2018)
Andrews, K. (2015), The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, Londres-Nueva York, Routledge.
Baber, C. (2003), Cognition and Tool Use: Forms of Engagement in Human and Animal Use of Tools, Londres-Nueva York, Taylor & Francis.
Beck, J. (2013), “Why We Can’t Say What Animals Think”, Philosophical Psychology, 26 (4), pp. 520-546.
Bekoff, M. (1998), “Cognitive Ethology”, en Bechtel, W., Graham, G. y Balota, D. A. (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 371-379.
Boesch, C. y Boesch, H. (1990), “Tool Use and Tool Making in Wild Chimpanzees”, Folia Primatologica, 54, pp. 86-99.
Brandom, R. (1997), “Study Guide” en Sellars, W., Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 119-181.
Camp, E. (2015), “Poniendo en marcha los pensamientos: conceptos, sistematicidad e independencia del estímulo” en Aguilera, M., Danón, L. y Scotto, C. (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición, Córdoba, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, pp. 149-210.
Church, J. (2006), “Locating the Space of Reasons”, Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 25 (1), pp. 85-96.
Clayton, N. y Dickinson, A. (1998), “Episodic-Like Memory during Cache Recovery by Scrub Jays”, Nature, 395 (6699), pp. 272-274.
Clayton, N., Emery, N. y Dickinson, A. (2006), “The Rationality of Animal Memory: Complex Caching Strategies of Western Scrub Jays” en Hurley, S. y Nudds, M. (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 197-216.
Crane, T. (2001), Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press.
Crystal, J. D. y Wilson, A. G. (2015), “Prospective Memory: A Comparative Perspective”, Behavioural processes, 112, pp. 88-99.
Danón, L. (2016), “Atribución intencional en primates no humanos: El giro hacia la explicación”, Ludus Vitalis, 23 (44), pp. 143-162.
Dennett, D. (1987), The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, The MIT Press [Trad. Dennet, D., La actitud intencional, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1991].
Fink, H. (2008), “Three Sorts of Naturalism”, en Lindgaard, J. (ed.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 52-71.
Fodor, J. (1998), In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Gärdenfors, P. (1995), “Cued and Detached Representations in Animal Cognition”, Behavioural Processes, 35 (1-3), pp. 263-273.
Gaskin, R. (2006). Experience and the World’s Own Language: A Critique of John McDowell’s Empiricism, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Glock, H.-J. (2009), “Can Animals Act for Reasons?”, Inquiry, 52 (3), pp. 232-254.
Gubeljic, M., Link, S., Müller, P. y Osburg, G. (2000), “Nature and Second Nature in McDowell’s Mind and World”, en McDowell, J. y Willaschek, M. (eds.), John McDowell, Reason and Nature: Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 1999, Münster, LIT., pp. 41-49.
Hare, B., Call, J., y Tomasello, M. (2001), “Do Chimpanzees Know What Conspecifics Know?”, Animal Behaviour, 61 (1), pp. 139-151.
Kalpokas, D. (en prensa), “Percepción y mente animales”, Revista de filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
Krupenye, C., Kano, F., Hirata, S., Call, J. y Tomasello, M. (2016), “Great Apes Anticipate that Other Individuals Will Act according to False Beliefs”, Science, 354 (6308), pp. 110-114.
McDowell, J. (1994), “The Content of Perceptual Experience”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (175), pp. 190-205.
McDowell, J. (1996), Mind and World, Harvard University Press. [Trad. McDowell, J., Mente y mundo, Barcelona, Sígueme, 2003.]
McDowell, J. (1998), “Two Sorts of Naturalism” en Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 167-197.
McDowell, J. (2000), “Responses” en McDowell, J. y Willaschek, M. (eds.) (2000), John McDowell, Reason and Nature: Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 1999, Münster, LIT., pp. 91-114.
McDowell, J. (2006), “Response to Jennifer Church” en Church, J. (2006), “Locating the Space of Reasons”, Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, pp. 97-100.
McDowell, J. (2008), “Responses” en Lindgaard, J. (ed.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 200-267.
McDowell, J. H. (2009), Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Mulcahy, N. J. y Call, J. (2006), “Apes Save Tools for Future Use”, Science, 312 (5776), pp. 1038-1040.
Newen, A. y Bartels, A. (2007), “Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts”, Philosophical Psycology, 20 (3), pp. 283-308.
Parker, S. T., Mitchell, R. W. y Boccia, M. L. (eds.) (2006). Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Plotnik, J. M., de Waal, F. B. M. y Reiss, D. (2006), “Self-Recognition in an Asian Elephant”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103 (45), pp. 17053-17057.
Povinelli, D. J. y Vonk, J. (2003), “Chimpanzee Minds: Suspiciously Human?”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7 (4), pp. 157-160.
Sellars, W. (1956/1997), Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Skidelsky, L. (2016), Representaciones mentales: Donde la filosofía de la mente y la filosofía de la ciencia cognitiva se equivocaron, Buenos Aires, Eudeba.
Tomasello, M. y Call, J. (1997), Primate Cognition, Nueva York, Oxford University Press.
Townsend, S. W. y Manser, M. B. (2013), “Functionally Referential Communication in Mammals: The Past, Present and the Future”, Ethology, 119 (1), pp. 1-11.
Weber, Max (1922), “Wissenschaft als Beruf, en Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre”, Tubinga, J. C. B. Mohr, pp. 524-555.
Wheeler, B. C. y Fischer, J. (2012), “Functionally Referential Signals: A Promising Paradigm whose Time has passed”, Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 21 (5), pp. 195-205.
Wild, M. (2008), Tierphilosophie zur Einführung, Hamburgo, Junius.
Wild, M. (2010), Biosemantik. Repräsentation, Intentionalität, Norm, Tesis de habilitación en la Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Recuperado de https://www.academia.edu/2095553/Biosemantik._Repräsentation_Intentionalität_Norm_2010 (30-03-2018)