Articles
Abstract
In the present paper I discuss some normative aspects of perceptual experience by considering Wittgenstein’s contributions to the topic in the Second Part of Philosophical Investigations (PI, II, xi). In these passages, Wittgenstein criticizes the physiological causalist explanations provided by Wolfgang Köhler as well as the representational empiricist view about sensory perception. These considerations allow him to show that interpretation plays a relevant role in certain cases of visual perception (preeminently in cases described as ‘seeing-as’). I propose, first, a way to extend this model to general cases of visual perception of objects generally stated by the expression ‘I see this’. Second, I examine some comparative advantages of this position with respect to its partial alternative, which consists in restricting Wittgenstein’s considerations just for the case of ‘I see it as’.
References
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Ayob, G. (2009), “The Aspect-Perception Passages: A Critical Investigation of Köhler Isomorphism Principle”, Philosophical Investigations, 32 (3), pp. 264-280.
Block, N. (2007), “Wittgenstein and Qualia”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21, pp. 73-115.
Burdman, F. (2016), “’¡No pienses, mira!’: Aspectos, persuasión y filosofía en Wittgenstein”, Tópicos, 31, pp. 1-21.
Burge, T. (1986), “Individualism and Psychology”, Philosophical Review, 95, pp. 3-45.
Burge, T. (2010), The Origins of Objectivity, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Cabanchik, S. (2010), Wittgenstein: La filosofía como ética, Buenos Aires, Quadrata.
Cabanchik, S. (2017), “Ética y política: Dimensiones prácticas de la experiencia del lenguaje en el filosofar wittgensteiniano”, Tópicos, 33, pp. 13-44.
Crary, A. y Read, R. (2000), The New Wittgenstein, Londres/Nueva York, Routledge.
Campbell, M. y O’Sullivan, M. (2015), “Wittgenstein on Perception: An Overview”, en Campbell, M. y O’Sullivan, M. (eds.) (2015), Wittgenstein and Perception, Londres/Nueva York, Routledge, pp. 10-32.
Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Good, J. (2006), Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception, Londres, Continuum.
Hutto, D. (2015), “Contentless Perceiving: The Very Idea”, en Campbell, M. y O’Sullivan, M. (eds.) (2015), Wittgenstein and Perception, Londres/Nueva York, Routledge, pp. 63-83.
Karczmarczyk, P. (2006), “Seguir un conejo: Reglas y cambio de aspectos” en Penelas, F. y Satne, G. (comps.) (2006), Gramáticas, juegos y silencio: Discusiones en torno a Wittgenstein, Buenos Aires, Grama, pp. 1-10.
Köhler, W. (1947), Gestalt Psychology: An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology, Nueva York, Liveright.
Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford, Blackwell.
McGinn, M. (1997), Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, Londres/Nueva York, Routledge.
Noë, A. (2004), Action in Perception, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Noë, A. (2015), “Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the Fragility of Presence”, en Metzinger, T. y Windt, J. M. (eds) (2015), Open MIND, Fráncfort del Meno, MIND Group, pp. 1074-1088.
Russell, B. (1912/1997), The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1984), Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, Londres, Routledge.
Satne, G. (2005), El argumento escéptico: De Wittgenstein a Kripke, Buenos Aires, Grama.
Wittgenstein, L. (BB), The Blue and Brown Book, (1998), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (LWPP 1), Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, von Wright, G. H., Nyman, H. (eds.) (1990), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (LWPP 2), Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, von Wright, G. H. (ed.) (1992), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (OC), On Certainty, Anscombe, G. E. M. y von Wright, G. H. (eds.) (1969/1998), Oxford, Basil Blackwell. [Trad. Reguera, I., Sobre la Certeza, edición bilingüe alemán-español, Madrid, Gredos, 2009.]
Wittgenstein, L. (PG), Philosophical Grammar, Rhees, R. (ed.) (1974/1993), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (PI), Philosophical Investigations, Anscombe, G. E. M. (ed.) (1953/1999), Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L. (RC), Remarks on Colour, Anscombe, G. E. M. (ed.) (1977/1998), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (RFM), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, von Wright, G. H., Rhees, R. y Anscombe, G. E. M. (eds.) (1956/1981), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (RPP 1), Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Anscombe, G. E. M. y von Wright, G. H. (eds.) (1980), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (RPP 2): Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, von Wright, G. H. (ed.) (1996), Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Yuan, M. S. (2018), “El pluralismo wittgensteiniano de Noë”, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 12 (2), pp. 138-154.