Vol. 40 No. 1 (2020)
Articles

Wittgenstein without intricacies: Meaning Scepticism and Autonomy of Grammar

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  • Pedro Diego Karczmarczyk
Pedro Diego Karczmarczyk
Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina / Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.332

Published 2020-05-01

Keywords

  • Seguimiento de reglas,
  • Acción intencional,
  • Escepticismo semántico
  • Rule-following,
  • Intentional Action,
  • Meaning-Scepticism
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Abstract

This paper analyses the two main thesis of the recently published Manuel Pérez Otero’s book Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein: the revision of the general symmetry between actions and omissions as intentional behaviour, and the proposal of a teleological (etiological) dispositional answer to Kripke’s Wittgenstein sceptical challenge about meaning. Concerning the first thesis, we show that the grammar of the attributions of intentions is neutral regarding causal determinism stressing the retrospective character implied by concept of a “justification post hoc”. Regarding the second thesis, we stress that the refusal of internism is not enough to make of teleological dispositions a satisfactory explanation of behaviour. We try to clarify the kind of problem posed by the Kripke’s Wittgenstein meaning scepticism: to abandon the conception that makes of “rule-following” the “praxis of a subject” for another that regards rule-followers as the “subjects of a practice”.

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