Vol. 41 No. 1 (2021)
Articles

Rationality for Humans

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  • Waldomiro J. Silva Filho
Waldomiro J. Silva Filho
Universidade Federal da Bahia, Brasil (UFBA) / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa Científica (CNPq), Brasil
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.345

Published 2021-05-01

Keywords

  • Rationality,
  • Agency,
  • Normativity
  • Racionalidad,
  • Agencia,
  • Normatividad
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Abstract

This article discusses the notion of rationality and agency in Fernando Broncano’s Racionalidad, Acción y Opacidad (2017). In this book, contradicting the apriorist normative theses or simple naturalistic descriptivism, Broncano argues that rationality is something that is directly associated with our ordinary practices of evaluating the judgments, actions and decisions of others. “Rationality” should be considered as a term we use as an intellectual qualifier or as a virtue we bestow on people who can make theoretical and practical decisions autonomously. Thus, rationality would not be an a priori condition for someone to become a person or a capacity to eliminate the turbulence of human cognitive and moral precariousness, but a form of involvement in the world that positively qualifies the organism that relates thought and action, judgment and choice in the search for lucidity in an uncertain world. With this, rationality and agency would be products of the social interdependence that one has in relation to the other, since we learn it and teach it in the context of natural life. This article is organized in three sections: in the first section I make a very brief presentation of one of the aspects of the problem that has motivated the philosophical discussion on rationality and agency; in the second section, I present my understanding of the themes developed in Racionalidad, Acción y Opacidad, their internal structure and, of course, their central thesis; in the third section, I specifically discuss the theme that the normativity of rationality arises from our dialectical encounter with other people and make personal considerations on the value and scope of the arguments constructed in this book.

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