Vol. 42 No. 1 (2022)
Thematic section

Asking for a Harry in his Context: An Historicist Solution to the Adoption Problem

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  • Miguel Alvarez Lisboa,
  • Carlo Apablaza Avila
Miguel Alvarez Lisboa
IIF-SADAF-CONICET
Carlo Apablaza Avila
Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.398

Published 2022-05-01

Keywords

  • Epistemologia da lógica,
  • Anti-excepcionalismo lógico,
  • História da lógica,
  • Revolução científica,
  • Taxonomias lexicais
  • Epistemología de la Lógica,
  • Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico,
  • Historia de la Lógica,
  • Revolución científica,
  • Taxonomías Lexicales
  • Epistemology of logic,
  • Logical Anti-exceptionalism,
  • History of Logic,
  • Scientific Revolution,
  • Lexical Taxonomies
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Abstract

The Adoption Problem claims that certain logical laws cannot be adopted. The argument is supposed to be a challenge to Logical anti-exceptionalism, insofar as the latter must justify the stance that logical theories can be revised. The purpose of this article is to answer this challenge, using as unit of analysis the concept of Lexical Taxonomies proposed by Kuhn. As we will show, a sociologically enriched vision of scientific theories and their changes permits to account for Logical anti-exceptionalism avoiding the Adoption Problem.

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