v. 42 n. 1 (2022)
Seção temática

Pedindo por um Harry no seu contexto: Uma solução historicista para o Problema da Adoção

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  • Miguel Alvarez Lisboa,
  • Carlo Apablaza Avila
Miguel Alvarez Lisboa
IIF-SADAF-CONICET
Carlo Apablaza Avila
Universidad de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.398

Publicado 2022-05-01

Palavras-chave

  • Epistemologia da lógica,
  • Anti-excepcionalismo lógico,
  • História da lógica,
  • Revolução científica,
  • Taxonomias lexicais
  • Epistemología de la Lógica,
  • Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico,
  • Historia de la Lógica,
  • Revolución científica,
  • Taxonomías Lexicales
  • Epistemology of logic,
  • Logical Anti-exceptionalism,
  • History of Logic,
  • Scientific Revolution,
  • Lexical Taxonomies
Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

O Problema da Adoção afirma que certas leis lógicas não podem ser adotadas. O argumento é considerado um desafio ao anti-excepcionalismo lógico, na medida em que este último deve justificar a posição de que as teorias lógicas podem ser revistas. O objetivo deste artigo é responder a esse desafio, utilizando como unidade de análise o conceito de Taxonomias Lexicais proposto por Kuhn. Como mostraremos, uma visão sociologicamente enriquecida das teorias científicas e suas mudanças permite explicar o anti-excepcionalismo Lógico, evitando o Problema da Adoção.

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