Vol. 42 No. 1 (2022)
Thematic section

Revising the Limits of the Adoption Problem

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  • Rocio Roitman,
  • Adriana Marrero
Rocio Roitman
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Adriana Marrero
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.405

Published 2022-05-01

Keywords

  • Adoption Problem,
  • Anti-exceptionalism,
  • Logic Revision,
  • Logical Principles,
  • Self-governing Principles
  • Problema de la adopción,
  • Antiexcepcionalismo,
  • Revisión de la lógica,
  • Principios lógicos,
  • Autogobierno
Creative Commons License

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to question if the adoption problem truly presents an obstacle for the revision of logic theories. Within this frame of reference, we argue in favor of an anti-exceptionalist point of view, and examine the kind of revision that follows from altering the inferential practices (logica utens) as a result of a change in the theoretical part of the system (logica docens). We also establish that even though the main consequence of the adoption problem can and should be conceded, that is to say, that there are certain logical principles that cannot be adopted, not only can we revise and alter our logic theory, but also reason in accordance with new inferential patterns. We conclude that the only direct consequence of the adoption problem is the rejection of the possibility to adopt certain logical principles, as well as the possibility to reason in accordance with them, but it does not imply the rejection of the possibility to incorporate or acquire them through other mechanisms. Particularly, it is still possible to do so in some cases through what we call “acquisition through immersion” and “acquisition through decoding”.

         
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