Vol. 40 No. Especial (2020): Lógica, lenguaje y representación. Homenaje a Alberto Moretti
Articles

The Difference between Showing and Saying and the Problem of Meaning

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  • Carlos Enrique Caorsi
Carlos Enrique Caorsi
Instituto de Filosofía, FHCE/UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.424

Published 2020-12-15

Keywords

  • The Unit of the Proposition,
  • Showing/saying,
  • Enunciation,
  • Triangulation
  • Unidad de la proposición,
  • Mostrar/decir,
  • Enunciación,
  • Triangulación
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Abstract

In this paper I am interested in considering Moretti’s conclusion, according to which there is a dissolution of the problem of the unity of the proposition in terms of the notion of interpretation, which seems to obviate the traditional solution based on referential relations, but which, nevertheless, either requires that kind of foundation or makes room for transcendental approaches that go beyond it. I mostly agree with this conclusion but I think it is appropriate to develop some considerations that separate me to some extent from some of his. In particular, I will focus on the distinction between saying and showing, and on Moretti’s interesting extension of this distinction, usually formulated for sentences, to situations of enunciation. Against his position, I will maintain that the impossibility of saying what the enunciation shows is less radical than the impossibility of saying what a sentence shows.

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