Vol. 42 No. 2 (2022)
Thematic section

Adoption Problem: ¿A Problem for a Pluralism about Logical Negation?

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  • Eliana Franceschini
Eliana Franceschini
IIF-SADAF-CONICET / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.446

Published 2022-11-11

Keywords

  • Negación lógica,
  • Pluralismo lógico,
  • Desafío de Carroll,
  • Problema de la Adopción,
  • Antiexcepcionalismo lógico
  • Logical Negation,
  • Logical Pluralism,
  • Carroll´s Challenge,
  • Adoption Problem,
  • Anti-exceptionalism about Logic
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Abstract

Departing from a number of theses about the meaning of logical negation, the present work offers a reflection about the relationship between logical pluralism and the status of some fundamental logical principles. The aim is to show that the Adoption Problem, such as it has been formulated by Kripke/Padró, does not represent a challenge for the anti-exceptionalism about logic. Logical laws don’t have a special status, even if there exist some laws that can’t be adopted, because we are able to abandon some of them and it is dropping rules, and not adopting them the way in which the logic is revised. Therefore, we can accept a kind of logical pluralism that gives us more than one set of principles that captures correctly the meaning of negation.

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