Vol. 35 No. 1 (2015): Homenaje a Carlos S. Nino I
Articles

The Superfluity of Law Paradox and the Epistemic Value of Democracy

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  • Ezequiel Monti
Ezequiel Monti
Universidad de Buenos Aires
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2015.51

Published 2015-05-01

Keywords

  • Carlos S. Nino,
  • Paradox of the Superfluousness of Law,
  • Normativity of Law,
  • Epistemic Theory of Democracy,
  • Authority,
  • Political Obligation
    • ...More
    Less
  • Carlos S. Nino,
  • Paradoja de la superfluidad del derecho,
  • Normatividad del derecho,
  • Teoría epistémica de la democracia,
  • Autoridad,
  • Obligación política
    • ...More
    Less
Creative Commons License

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Abstract

In this paper I critically analyse Nino’s thesis according to which the epistemic value of democracy solves the paradox of the superfluousness of law. In this regard, I address two issues. First, if the epistemic value of democracy is a reason to believe that we have reasons to act in conformity with democratic laws. Second, if the epistemic value of democracy is a reason to act in conformity with democratic laws independently of the merits of the case and, in that case, if that can adequately explain the normativity of law.

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References

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