Vol. 42 No. 1 (2022)
Thematic section

The Problem of Adopting Logical Rules

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  • Romina Padró,
  • Eduardo A. Barrio
Romina Padró
Saul Kripke Center, City University of New York, New York, USA
Eduardo A. Barrio
IIF-SADAF-CONICET / Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.542

Published 2022-05-01

Keywords

  • Metainferencias,
  • Seguimiento de reglas,
  • Modus Ponens
  • Metainferences,
  • Following Rules,
  • Modus Ponens
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Abstract

Do we follow rules of inference when reasoning? As intuitive as the positive answer to this question is, there are a number of difficulties in linking logical rules and inferential practices. The Problem of the Adoption of Rules of Inference constitutes a challenge for anyone who proposes that we can follow new inferential patterns from the recognition of rules. In this special issue, various topics connected to whether we can follow a new inferential pattern by virtue of a rule are explored.

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