Published 1999-05-01
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Abstract
In this paper I examine the impact of the different naturalizing attempts in the philosophy of mind. l distinguish two different sources of these atternpts: the quinean proposal of naturalizing philosophy as a metaphilosophical program, and the project of defense of a substantive metaphysical naturalist thesis -that conflates naturalism with physicalism-, according to which our world is a "causally self-enclosed system" (Armstrong 1978). I argue that the main common denominator is the idea of rethinking the relationship between philosophy, science and common scnse, but that it does not imply that philosophy loses its own distinctive methods nor that philosophical problems are to be replaced by scientific ones.
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