Articles
Published 2017-11-01
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Abstract
As Evans (1985) and García-Carpintero (2008) have pointed out, one of the main issues concerning assertion in under a radical relativist account of evaluative discourses is to provide a coherent account of the commitments and the responsibilities generated by assertion when its correctness conditions are unstable. Building upon work done by Losada (2015), the present paper aims to offer such an account.
References
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Caso, R. (2014), “Assertion and Relative Truth”, Synthese, 191, pp. 1309–1325.
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García-Carpintero, M. y Kölbel, M. (eds.) (2008), Relative Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Kölbel, M. (2008a), “Motivations for Relativism”, en García-Carpintero, Relative Truth, ed. M. y Kölbel, M. (eds.) (2008), Relative Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-38.
Kölbel, M. (2008b), “Truth in Semantics”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32, pp. 242-257.
Kölbel, M. (2009), “The Evidence for Relativism”, Synthese, 166, pp. 375-395.
Losada, A. (2015), “Relativismo, corrección y responsabilidad”, en Orlando, E. (ed.), Significados en contexto y verdad relativa: Ensayos sobre semántica y pragmática, Buenos Aires, Título, pp. 189-206.
MacFarlane, J. (2005), “Making Sense of Relative Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105, pp. 305-323.
MacFarlane, J. (2014), Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Brandom, R. (1994), Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Caso, R. (2014), “Assertion and Relative Truth”, Synthese, 191, pp. 1309–1325.
Caso, R. (2016), “Modelando la aserción relativista”, Análisis Filosófico, 36 (2), pp. 225-259.
Dummett, M. (1976), “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)”, en Evans, G. y McDowell, J. (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 67-137.
Evans, G. (1985), “Does Tense Logic Rest upon a Mistake?”, en Collected Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 343-363.
García-Carpintero, M. (2008), “Relativism, Vagueness, and What is Said”, en García-Carpintero, M. y Kölbel, M. (eds.) (2008), Relative Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 129–154.
García-Carpintero, M. y Kölbel, M. (eds.) (2008), Relative Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Greenough, P. (2011), “Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion”, en Brown, J. y Cappelen, H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 197–231.
Kaplan, D. (1989), “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”, en Almog, J., Perry, J. y Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 481-563.
Kölbel, M. (2008a), “Motivations for Relativism”, en García-Carpintero, Relative Truth, ed. M. y Kölbel, M. (eds.) (2008), Relative Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-38.
Kölbel, M. (2008b), “Truth in Semantics”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32, pp. 242-257.
Kölbel, M. (2009), “The Evidence for Relativism”, Synthese, 166, pp. 375-395.
Losada, A. (2015), “Relativismo, corrección y responsabilidad”, en Orlando, E. (ed.), Significados en contexto y verdad relativa: Ensayos sobre semántica y pragmática, Buenos Aires, Título, pp. 189-206.
MacFarlane, J. (2005), “Making Sense of Relative Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105, pp. 305-323.
MacFarlane, J. (2014), Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, Oxford, Clarendon Press.