Vol. 37 No. 2 (2017)
Articles

The relevance of Nonsense

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  • Damián E. Szmuc
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2017.67

Published 2017-11-01

Keywords

  • Logics of Nonsense,
  • Infectious Logics,
  • Non-Classical Logics,
  • Analytic Inferences,
  • Synthetic Inferences
  • Lógicas del sinsentido,
  • Lógicas infecciosas,
  • Lógicas no clásicas,
  • Inferencias analíticas,
  • Inferencias sintéticas
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Abstract

In this paper, we will propose, discuss and formalize criteria that will allow us to legitimately claim that an inference or argument is analytic or synthetic. To do so, we will need to discuss the notion of subject matter of a given sentence or formula, for this notion will be crucial in determining the analytic and/or synthetic nature of inferences. In due course, we will try to show that there is a certain philosophical interest in entertaining semantics for logical systems that admit truth-values that are nonsense, and that is why we will make essential use of two “Logics of Nonsense” introduced by Dimitri Bochvar and Sören Halldén, respectively. The interest of considering systems with these semantics will be that, under certain conditions, such systems could be taken as analytic, or synthetic.

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