Vol. 33 No. 2 (2013): Homenaje a Eugenio Bulygin II
Articles

La clausura interna de los sistemas normativos

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  • Horacio Spector
Horacio Spector
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2013.85

Published 2013-11-01

Keywords

  • Permission,
  • Normative system,
  • Practical reasoning,
  • Deontic logics
  • Permisión,
  • Sistema normativo,
  • Razonamiento práctico,
  • Lógicas deónticas
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Abstract

Eugenio Bulygin claims that Joseph Raz's theory on the necessary closure of normative systems derives from the error to take weak or negative permissions as normative solutions. Bulygin believes that Raz fails to notice that legal statements are second-level normative propositions and that the only permissions capable of closing a normative system are strong or explicit permissions. In this paper I argue that Raz focuses on one kind of closure that is inconceivable within the context of a reductionist program such as Bulygin's. Once one visualizes that legal statements are first-level practical claims, it seems obvious that Raz's closure rule is a deontic theorem.

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References

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  9. Wright, G. H. von (1970), Norma y acción. Una investigación lógica, García Ferrero, P. (trad.), Madrid, Tecnos.