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Dos argumentos mecánico-cuánticos contra la equivalencia metafísica entre las teorías de substrato y de haces sobre la individualidad

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  • Raoni Arroyo,
  • Jonas R. Becker Arenhart
Raoni Arroyo
Graduate Program in Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianopolis, Brazil.
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart
Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianopolis, Brazil / Graduate Program in Philosophy, Federal University of Maranhão, São Luís, Brazil.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1203

Publicado 2026-01-06

Palabras clave

  • Metaphysical Equivalence,
  • Metametaphysics,
  • Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics,
  • Substratum and Bundle Theories of Individuality,
  • Metaphysical Underdetermination
  • Equivalencia metafísica,
  • Metametafísica,
  • Metafísica de la mecánica cuántica,
  • Teorías de substrato y de haces sobre la individualidad,
  • Indeterminación metafísica
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Existe un consenso generalizado entre los metafísicos en cuanto a que las teorías de haces y de substrato son teorías metafísicas de la individualidad sustancialmente diferentes. Desde una postura realista de la metafísica, ninguna de las dos puede reflejar la verdad al describir la realidad fundamental, por lo que son teorías metafísicas rivales. En contra de ese consenso, Jiri Benovsky ha planteado una tesis meta-metafísica según la cual, en realidad, son metafísicamente equivalentes. Este artículo cuestiona la tesis de equivalencia de Benovsky con dos contraargumentos basados en la metafísica de la mecánica cuántica: la indeterminación metafísica cuántica y el realismo de la función de onda. Como argumentaremos, aunque podría decirse que tanto la teoría de substrato como la de haces fallan en la mecánica cuántica estándar, lo hacen de maneras diferentes. Por lo tanto, dada la propia noción de equivalencia metafísica de Benovsky, no son equivalentes.

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Citas

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