Vol. 42 Núm. 2 (2022)
Sección temática

El problema de la adopción y el relativismo sobre la lógica

Publicado 2022-11-11

Palabras clave

  • Logic,
  • Metaphysics,
  • Epistemology,
  • Relativism,
  • Confirmation,
  • A priori,
  • A posteriori
  • ...Más
    Menos
  • Lógica,
  • Metafísica,
  • Epistemología,
  • Relativismo,
  • Confirmación,
  • A priori,
  • A posteriori
  • ...Más
    Menos

Resumen

El problema de la adopción fue originalmente planteado por Saul Kripke. Se supone  que presenta una dificultad al punto de vista de Willard Van Orman Quine de que  los enunciados de la ley lógica son empíricamente confirmables. Quiero presentar dos  argumentos en relación al problema de la adopción. El primero es que el problema  de la adopción no socava realmente la idea de que los enunciados de la ley lógica son  empíricamente confirmables. El segundo es que se puede desarrollar un análogo del  problema de la adopción para criticar una forma de relativismo sobre la lógica.

Citas

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