v. 42 n. 2 (2022)
Seção temática

The Adoption Problem and Relativism about Logic

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  • Daniel Boyd
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.389

Publicado 2022-11-11

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

The adoption problem was originally raised by Saul Kripke. It is supposed to present a difficulty for Willard Van Orman Quine’s view that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. I want to argue for two things in relation to the adoption problem. The first is that the adoption problem does not really undermine the idea that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. The second is that an analogue of the adoption problem can be developed in order to criticize a form of relativism about logic.

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Referências

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