v. 44 n. 2 (2024)
Artigos

¿Cómo es estar en un estado de percepción pura?

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  • Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa
Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa
Departamento de Psicología, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, España.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1042

Publicado 2024-11-08

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

La idea de percepción pura (percepción sin influencia cognitiva) es central para la ciencia y la filosofía de la percepción. Para muchos, estar en un estado perceptivo puro es estar en un estado cuyo contenido no es conceptual, cuyo formato es icónico y cuya fenomenología es única. Este artículo explora esta posibilidad y encuentra que la idea de percepción pura, al menos cuando se define en estos términos, es insostenible. Además de importantes preocupaciones específicas derivadas de las propiedades que caracterizan estos estados, no he encontrado bases empíricas que indiquen la posibilidad de individualizar estos estados: ni mirar dentro de uno mismo (introspección), ni mirar dentro de los demás (psicología), ni mirar dentro del cerebro (neuroanatomía), sugiere la existencia de estados mentales perceptivos puros.

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