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¿Puede la revelación servir de punto de apoyo al antifisicismo?

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  • Luis-Alberto Miranda-Quiroga
Luis-Alberto Miranda-Quiroga
Universidad de Valencia, Valencia, España.
##plugins.themes.classic.biography##
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1130

Publicado 2024-12-04

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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

Este artículo ofrece una evaluación crítica de la tesis revelacionista, defendida principalmente por Philip Goff, quien sostiene que la introspección revela la totalidad de la naturaleza esencial de las propiedades fenoménicas y garantiza una justificación excepcional de juicios y creencias introspectivos. La discusión se estructura en dos ejes principales: en primer lugar, partiendo del carácter conceptual y proposicional de la revelación, se pretende refutar la supuesta infalibilidad revelacionista, remarcando más bien su vulnerabilidad frente a la posibilidad de error, confusión y desacuerdo. En segundo lugar, se argumenta la insuficiencia de la revelación para acceder a la totalidad de los hechos esenciales de las propiedades fenoménicas, centrándose, para dicho efecto, en los aspectos relativos a la fundamentación, relaciones cuantitativas y cualitativas entre propiedades y disposiciones causales. A partir de estos cuestionamientos, se concluye que el revelacionismo no brinda un apoyo sólido y plausible para el antifisicismo.

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