v. 44 n. 1 (2024)
Artigos

Paraconsistency, Evidence and Semantic Incompleteness

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  • Edson Bezerra
Edson Bezerra
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e986

Publicado 2024-05-07

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Resumo

In this paper, we argue that the systems Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ) suffer a kind of semantic incompleteness with respect to the informal notion of evidence. More especifically, we argue that the connective o of the logic LETJ fails to validate intuitive principles about conclusive evidence.

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