Vol. 22 Nro. 2 (2002)
Articles

Interacción y atribución mental: la perspectiva de la segunda persona

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  • Carolina Scotto
Carolina Scotto
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina / CONICET
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2002.238

Published 2002-11-01

Keywords

  • Second person,
  • Intentional attribution,
  • Interaction
  • Segunda persona,
  • Atribución intencional,
  • Interacción
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In this paper I intend to show that the debate between the first and the third person point of view of ordinary mental attribution needs to be redefined in order to make room to a more basic perspective, the second person point of view. The reason for this is that this point of view is able to account of a variety of phenomena that are left out of consideration from the other ones. Firstly, I defend a characterization of the different abilities that includes this kind of reciprocal understanding. Secondly, I identify some interactive phenomena that are better viewed as cases of intentional attribution made from the second personal point of view.

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